II. Innovation in the Industry
The PC industry has introduced many innovations in its 25 year history. Product innovation includes the creation of new product categories such as notebook PCs and PDAs, as well as the creation of new product platforms such as multimedia PCs and wireless "mobility" notebooks. The scope and outcome of product innovation in PCs is shaped by the presence of global architectural standards set originally by IBM and now largely controlled by Microsoft and Intel. Common interface standards enable innovators to reach a global market with standard product lines; thus economies of scale can be achieved to support investments in product development and manufacturing capacity. This is different from industries such as mobile phones or video games, in which multiple incompatible standards exist. An example of the benefits of standardization is the acceptance of 802.11 as a common standard which spurred the introduction of wireless networking as a standard feature on notebook PCs. On the other hand, standardization battles can constrain innovation as PC makers are reluctant to incorporate technologies before a standard is set, as is the case with second generation DVD technology.
When PC makers do innovate, they face hard choices in trying to capture profits from their innovations. One alternative is to incorporate the innovation only in their own products to differentiate their PCs from those of competitors, but there is a question of whether they can convince customers to pay for the differentiation and also whether customers will want to adopt a non-standard technology. Another is to license the technology broadly, which might bring in license fees and even establish the technology as an industry standard, but will eliminate product differentiation. One current example is HP's Personal Media Drive (PMD), a portable hard drive that slides into a special slot in HP Media Center PCs. HP incorporated the special slot into some of its own products, while letting customers connect the PMD to competitors' PCs using a slower USB connection, thus differentiating HP's PCs. By contrast, HP has licensed its LightScribe technology for labeling DVDs and CDs to other PC makers. In either case, it can be difficult to translate innovation into profits sufficient to justify the R&D effort.
Despite these challenges, which may discourage radical innovation, PC makers are pushed to incremental innovation by component makers who introduce frequent changes in their products (faster speed, greater capacity, smaller form factor, longer life) in efforts to gain greater market share within their industry sector such as semiconductors, storage or power supply. PC makers feel they have to adopt these changes rather than risk being left behind by a competitor that does adopt. One PC maker expressed the view that it would be better for everyone if the pace of innovation were slower, but no one is willing to take the risk of such a slowdown. Thus, competition and innovation in the supply chain tends to push PC makers into incremental changes that do little to differentiate products.
As a result, PC makers have tended to concentrate on operational efficiency, marketing, and distribution, rather than trying to use product differentiation as a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 1996) . Product innovation at the system level tends to be incremental and emphasizes developing slightly different products for narrowly defined market niches, such as PC gamers who demand high performance or business travelers who desire ultra-light notebooks, rather than more distinctively innovative products. 2 Instead, most product innovation occurs upstream in components and software, which are then incorporated by PC makers.
Consistent with the emphasis on efficiency and distribution, the industry has introduced business process innovations such as outsourcing, using the Internet as a direct sales channel, vendor managed inventory, third party logistics, and build-to-order (BTO) production. At the plant level, some firms have replaced assembly lines with small production cells to facilitate BTO production, and adopted process improvements such as reducing the number of steps and improving quality in final assembly. They also have employed a range of information technologies such as shop floor management systems, bar coding, and automated software downloads to improve manufacturing performance (Kraemer et al, 2000) . However, while early adoption of these innovations benefited some companies, particularly Dell Inc., competing PC makers have since adopted these and other process innovations and closed the gap on key measures such as inventory turnover and time-to-market for new products (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2005) .
Today, most companies use a mix of build to forecast and build to order processes that is optimal for their targeted markets. The result is greater efficiency in the industry as a whole, but the benefit have not gone to the PC makers. They have mostly gone to consumers in the form of lower prices, and to Microsoft and Intel, as software and microprocessors account for an ever greater share of the total cost of a PC.
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In order to understand innovation in the industry, it is important to look at the structure of the innovation network, the innovation processes, the key personal computing products and interdependencies between innovation processes, products, and the structure of the network.
2 An exception is Apple, which emphasizes attractive design and close integration of hardware and proprietary software in its products. While this has been very successful in its iPod line, Apple's market share in PCs is under 4% worldwide, so it is unclear that its innovative PCs have done more than satisfy a small core of Mac users who are willing to pay a premium for its products. By adopting Intel processors for all of its products, Apple has abandoned its proprietary hardware platform in favor of global economies of scale and greater compatibility with Windows PCs. 3 Even these duopolists face challenges: Intel from AMD and Microsoft from Linux in one product category (servers).
Figure 1. The PC Industry Innovation Network
Adapted from Curry and Kenney (1999) . 
Innovation Processes
Product innovation in the industry occurs through two broad processes--R&D and new product development. R&D is an ongoing activity that generates new knowledge that can be applied to new products. New product development is a multi-stage process of design, development and production that creates physical products for target markets.
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Although conceptually distinct, there is often a close interaction between the two in practice. New product development integrates knowledge developed by R&D, and R&D is often called on to solve a specific problem in product development. Given that most R&D is done upstream by the component suppliers, the process of knowledge integration occurs between the supplier and PC maker. The focus is on knowledge needed to integrate a standard component, but occasionally it involves customization or even more intensive joint development. This is especially the case when an entirely new product is being created such as the wireless notebook that requires integration of communication technologies, or in the case of a new product category such as the Apple iPod.
Products and Innovation Activities
Although new form factors are emerging, desktops and notebooks remain the leading products in the industry, with important differences between them that affect innovation activities. For desktops, product innovation mainly centers on conventional systems integration--incorporating new parts, components, and software into a system 5 A detailed discussion of these phases and the activities within each is provided in Dedrick and Kraemer (2006b) .
and ensuring that they work together. The system is largely standardized with respect to components, parts, and interfaces according to standards set by Microsoft and Intel. So, innovation involves the selection of components to be included for different target markets (e.g., home, office, game, "value" or "power" user). Most use a standard full tower or mid-tower chassis with industrial design applied mainly to the bezel (face) to reflect a certain brand image. A few newer models aimed at consumers' living rooms have moved away from the "beige box" to smaller and more stylish designs with unique chassis and industrial designs. PC vendors generally keep concept design and product planning in-house for close control over brand image, user interface, features, cost, and quality. Outsourcing of physical development has occurred in a series of steps since the mid-1990s-first motherboard design, then mechanical design, system test, and finally software build and validation. Intel facilitated this trend by providing support and reference designs to ODMs who develop motherboards and full systems.
For notebooks, innovation involves high level system integration with complex mechanical, electrical, and software challenges. Design of such a small form factor presents special challenges with heat dissipation, electromagnetic interference and power consumption, while the need for portability requires greater ruggedness. Although components such as disk drives and flat panels are mostly standardized, notebooks involve many custom parts. For example, in order to fit the modular components within the notebook chassis, the motherboard and battery pack may have to be customized for each notebook model. The chassis and other mechanical parts require custom tooling.
PC vendors usually keep notebook design in-house, but coordinate physical development jointly with the ODM because there is a strong interdependency between the physical product development and manufacturing. It is critical that product development take manufacturability into account from the beginning, otherwise a product may be developed that cannot be produced at the necessary volume, cost or quality. Most notebook PCs are designed to be built in a particular assembly plant, with specific manufacturing process requirements. As a result, product development and final assembly are almost always handled by one company. In some cases, this means the PC maker keeps both in-house. In most cases it means outsourcing both development and manufacturing of each model to a single ODM.
Thus, the interdependencies of PC form factors and New Product Development (NPD) activities have led to different organizational arrangements for desktops and notebooks ( Figure 2 ). Because desktops are less complex and more standardized, a complete product specification can be handed off for development and production to ODMs, or a fully developed product can be turned over to a CM for manufacturing.
However, because of their greater complexity and customization, notebooks tend to be designed and developed jointly by the PC vendors and ODMs. 
III. Changing International Structure of Demand and Supply

Trends in Demand
PC demand has been shifting steadily for over a decade towards smaller, more integrated and more communications-oriented products. The global demand for PCs is changing in terms of form factor, commercial vs. consumer markets and regional consumption. Portable devices (laptops and notebooks) are the fastest growing form factor, totaling 32% of unit demand in 2005, compared to just 10% in 1990 (Figure 3) , and expected to exceed desktops in the next five years (IDC, 2006b) . Other portable devices such as smart phones have seen rapid growth as well. This means that there will be more demand for complex innovation in concept, design, and engineering in the future and that coordination among these stages will have to become much closer. firms such as Toshiba moved their own notebook production to the region to take advantage of the supply base, but also outsourced much of their production as well.
Geographic Location of Production
6 These locations are now changing once again. For example, Dell is moving final assembly and suppliers to Poland for EMEA; both Dell and HP are encouraging their CMs to move to India for the Asia region; Dell is setting up final assembly in India. 7 Some notebook ODMs and suppliers moved to the area as early as 1998 so there was already a supply base when most of the industry moved. For example, Asustek had 300 employees in China in 1999 and 45,000 by 2005 (Einhorn, 2005) .
Chinese firms such as Lenovo used these same supply bases for their own production and outsourced some as well. By 2005 China was the single largest producer of PCs and computer equipment overall in the world. Although the production facilities were located in China, they were mostly owned and managed by Taiwanese firms, such as HonHai/Foxconn and Mitac for desktops, and Quanta, Compal, Wistron and Inventec for notebooks. 9 The supply chain was also composed largely of Taiwanese firms. Foxconn has a huge facility in Shenzhen that employs over 100,000 workers and produces base units and/or complete systems for nearly every branded PC vendor, while also assembling products such as game consoles and iPods, and making components such as cables, connectors, chassis and motherboards.
Taiwanese ODMs produced 85% of all notebooks in the world in 2005 (Table 1) , mostly in the Shanghai/Suzhou region of China.
In the past the location of final assembly was driven by the need for in the U.S.
and Europe, but now appears to be driven by growing demand in Asia as well as by the growing capability of firms to exploit lower costs for labor, land and facilities, the availability of cost-effective skilled labor, and government incentives in China. 10 For instance, low cost sea shipment of standard (not build-to-order) desktop PCs from China to the U.S., supported by more sophisticated demand forecasting and planning tools, allows PC makers to build a three-week shipment time into the new product introduction cycle. Notebooks can be economically shipped by air, so even BTO production can be centralized in Asia. Also, with most of the supply chain in Asia, it can be cheaper to assemble there and minimize shipment time for components as the supply base is concentrated there.
IV. Globalization of Innovation
The location of NPD activities by the branded PC firms is driven by the product and process interdependencies discussed in Section II, the capabilities and relative costs of different locations, and relational factors that tend to "pull" innovation outside the PC vendor and/or offshore. The relative capabilities and costs of U.S. firms and those in other countries have resulted in a new global division of labor: higher value architectural design and business management, along with associated "dynamic"/analytical engineering work is done in the U.S., whereas the development and manufacturing of the physical product, along with the more routine, "transactional" product and process engineering is done in Taiwan and increasingly in China. The result is that both component and system innovation is increasingly global, but U.S. firms continue to play leading roles in both.
Capabilities and Cost
The design of desktops and notebooks involves understanding markets and customer demand, as well as technology trends, anticipating how customer demand and technology trends are converging, and coordinating mixed teams of marketing people and technologists. It requires people with skills and experience in high level architectural design, with the associated dynamic engineering skills, industrial design, and business/product management. 11 In terms of proximity, it is important to be located in leading markets where new technologies are developed and adopted first.
Development for desktops or notebooks involves more routine, transactional product and process engineering. Therefore, it requires people with mechanical, electrical and software engineering skills and technical project management experience. In addition, notebook development requires specialized skills in thermal, electromagnetic interference, shock and vibration, power management, materials, radio frequency, and software. These require a combination of formal training and experience working in a particular engineering specialty, as well as working on the specific product type.
Such knowledge and skill levels vary significantly in different locations due to at least three factors. These are: (1) historical industrial development leading to creation of specialized skills, (2) output of educational systems, (3) nature of demand, including market scale and the extent to which the local or regional market may be described as cutting edge, with demanding and innovative customers.
In the U.S., there are business skills such as market intelligence and product management that are hard to find elsewhere. There are also leading industrial design firms that specialize in small electronic products such as notebooks and cell phones, and strong software and high-level engineering skills. These skills are taught in universities, invested in by leading domestic firms in the industry, and honed through proximity to leading edge users.
In Japan, there are industrial designers that are very good at designing for the Japanese market, but also have experience designing for global markets. Japanese engineering teams have deep skills in design and development, with specialties such as miniaturization that have developed to meet Japanese demand for small, lightweight products. Japan also is very strong in process engineering and manufacturing operations, thanks to its historical and continued emphasis on manufacturing.
11 Gereffi and Wadhwa (2006) distinguish between dynamic and transactional engineers, a classification that we find useful in characterizing the engineering work forces in different countries based on our interviews. Dynamic engineers are capable of abstract thinking and high-level problem solving using scientific knowledge, able to work in teams and work across international borders. These engineers have at least four-year degrees in engineering and are leaders in innovation. Transactional engineers have engineering fundamentals but not the skill to apply this knowledge to larger problems. They usually have less than four year degrees and are responsible for rote engineering tasks.
In Taiwan, mechanical and electrical engineers are available with strong practical experience as well as theoretical knowledge. Taiwan's historical specialization in the PC industry and with notebooks, in particular, has created a pool of engineers with a great depth of knowledge in these products. Taiwan also has strong process and manufacturing skills. These have developed over time as Taiwanese firms have taken on greater responsibilities in PC development and manufacturing. Taiwan mostly lacks marketing skills and industrial design skills that would allow it to take over the concept and product planning stages, because of its focus on OEM/ODM production rather than development of branded products.
China has many well-trained mechanical and electrical engineers, but most lack the hands-on skills that come with experience. Industrial design is weak and marketing and business skills are very underdeveloped. A large number of engineers are produced each year, but quality varies greatly by university. According to one interviewee, China's engineers "work perfectly at doing what they have been told, but cannot think about what needs to be done; they lack both creativity and motivation. They are good at legacy systems, but not new things; they can't handle 'what if' situations."
In comparing cost across countries, the average salary for electronics engineers in all industries in the U.S. is about $80,000, compared to $60,000 in Japan, $20,000 in Taiwan, and under $10,000 in China (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006b) . Obviously there are cost advantages to moving engineering to China, but differences in productivity related to education and experience can negate the direct cost differences. Also, it is reported that engineering salaries are rising quickly in China, especially in industry clusters such as the Shanghai/Suzhou area, as multinationals and Taiwanese firms compete with domestic companies for talent. The willingness of multinationals to pay higher salaries gives them access to more experienced engineers and graduates of top universities, but turnover rates are high.
Based on a survey of Taiwanese PC and electronics firms, Lu and Liu (2004) found that the main reason these companies were moving R&D (primarily development)
to China was the availability of well-educated and cost effective local engineers. This finding is supported by our own interviews with Taiwanese companies. As Taiwan's supply of engineers has failed to keep up with demand, the attraction of a large pool of engineers with both linguistic and geographical proximity has been strong. This has enabled Taiwanese engineers to concentrate on more advanced development activities while lower-value activities such as board layout and software testing have moved to
China.
The New Global Division of Labor
This confluence of product and process interdependencies with changing capabilities and costs in different locations has led to a new global division of labor Japanese PC firms still kept NPD in-house, at least for higher value products.
In 2006, the U.S. position was unchanged. However, PC vendors like HP and Dell had set up design centers in Taiwan to manage NPD for some products (usually more mature product lines). Locating design in Taiwan allows closer coordination with CMs and ODMs, potentially speeding up NPD and allowing better quality control and problem resolution. They also use these design centers to transfer knowledge to the ODMs and to train locally hired hardware and software engineers to take on more project management and software development activities. This division of labor is similar for notebooks and desktops, although some U.S. companies keep desktop development in the U.S. and then outsource manufacturing to Asia. However, desktop development (which is much more limited, given the standardization of components and subassemblies) is being shifted to Taiwanese ODMs in many cases.
Figure7. New Global Division of Labor in PC Industry
The next critical development was the rapid shift of production to mainland China. Encouraged by U.S. PC vendors, Taiwanese manufacturers had moved production of desktops and many components and subassemblies to the Pearl River Delta near Hong Kong in the 1990s. Even more dramatic was the shift of notebook production to the Shanghai/Suzhou area after 2000. Many Taiwanese suppliers to the notebook industry had moved to China before 2001. When the Taiwanese government lifted its restrictions on notebook production in China, the ODMs and the rest of their local suppliers moved nearly all of their production to the mainland (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006a) .
In response to U.S. PC makers outsourcing production to Taiwanese ODMs in China, the Japanese PC makers also shifted significant production to China, both through their own subsidiaries and through outsourcing to the Taiwanese ODMs. This further illustrates the compelling economics of the production bases in China as Japanese firms have previously tended to keep production in-house, either in Japan or Southeast Asia.
China's Expanding Role as a Locus of Innovation
As a result of "production pull" as well as the large pool of lower cost engineering skills, there is an ongoing shift of product development activities from Taiwan to China.
During our interviews with notebook makers in Taiwan and China, one major ODM told us that they did all of their board layout and most packaging design in China, while doing mechanical engineering and software engineering in Taiwan. They were in the process of training people in their electronic engineering methods in China in order to move more development there. As one manager said, "China is a gold mine of human resources, but if you don't get in and train them you won't be able to take advantage of it."
It is expected that more of the NPD process and the associated engineering tests will be conducted in China by many notebook makers (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006a ).
These will be relocated from Taiwan, and in some cases, Japan. The shift of product development to China is not only distinguished by which activities have moved or are moving, but also by the type of products that are being developed. Some ODMs are moving product updates to China. However, development of completely new products and platforms is still done by the ODMs in Taiwan, or by PC makers such as Lenovo (for Thinkpad notebooks) and Toshiba in Japan. More recent interviews with Taiwanese companies suggest that they are hesitant to move these activities to China. This is due in part to the high turnover rate of engineers in China, which make it hard to develop cohesive development teams and also raises the risk of intellectual property loss. Also, unless intellectual property protections are strengthened, China is not likely to become a center for advanced component-level R&D, e.g., in microprocessors, LCDs, or wireless technologies.
A near term division of labor for product development is likely to be as follows:
component-level R&D, concept design, and product planning in the U.S. and Japan;
applied R&D and development of new platforms in Taiwan; product development for mature products, and nearly all production and sustaining engineering 12 in China. It is difficult to estimate how long this division of labor will last. A recent study of 12 Sustaining engineering is the second of two phases in production: mass production and sustaining engineering. Mass production involves the physical manufacturing of a product in large volumes. It requires manufacturing engineers to manage and plan the production process and test facilities and quality engineers to continually improve product and process quality. Over time, these engineers come to know the product extremely well and are best positioned to provide sustaining engineering support that was previously provided by the original product development teams. Sustaining engineering deals with changes that occur because of new chips, failing or end-of-life components or improved components. Each change must be evaluated in terms of its implications for system performance and assembly, and incorporated into the production process. The sustaining engineers also provide the highest level of technical support when problems occur during use during a product's 2-3 year warranty period.
Taiwanese manufacturers (Li, 2006) shows that the rapid growth of low margin outsourcing business from foreign MNCs has provided Taiwanese firms with the resources and motivation to invest more in R&D in order to develop greater technology expertise and capture more high value design work. As the ODMs' expertise grows,
MNCs have greater incentive to outsource more design activities to further lower costs.
Li also shows that Taiwanese firms are attempting to capture value from their innovation efforts by filing for more patents. So the shift from Taiwan to China may be slowing but the shift from the U.S. to Taiwan could continue. This is exemplified by the rapid growth of Taiwan design centers owned by HP and Dell.
In addition, Taiwanese Lenovo's acquisition of IBM's PC business has put it directly in competition with HP and
Dell around the world, while Huawei uses its relationship with 3Com to access technology and markets and compete with Cisco and others. These companies can use the supply base of Taiwanese and foreign companies in China to match the multinationals on cost, develop products that fit the local marekt and then target other emerging markets where innovations developed for the Chinese market are likely to be attractive.
Measurement of the Globalization of Innovation
Measuring the globalization of innovation is more difficult than measuring globalization of manufacturing, which can be captured in national production, trade, and foreign investment accounts. Innovation might be indirectly measured by R&D spending and employees, patents and new product introductions. While some public data on these measures is available, often it is not sufficiently disaggregated at the firm level so that it can be tied to a product line such as PCs. This is especially true of multidivisional firms such as HP, Fujitsu, Toshiba, Hitachi, Samsung and Sony. Also, firm-level data does not
show the extent to which R&D or other innovative activity is carried out in the home country or other locations.
Given these difficulties, an alternative approach is to measure the innovation effort by the CMs and ODMs who are doing much of the manufacturing in the industry.
The share of global notebook shipments produced by Taiwanese ODMs rose from 40% in 1998 to 85% in 2005 (Table 1) . (Table 2) , as has the proportion of employees with PhD and masters degrees in these firms. However, most of this R&D spending is on the development side rather than the research side. Also, reiterating a point made earlier that most innovation is done by upstream component makers, the R&D spending by the ODMs and CMs, as well as nearly all of the PC makers, is minor in comparison to that of upstream suppliers. For example, Table   3 shows that in 2005 some of the lead PC makers 13 spent 1.4% of revenues on R&D on average (weighted), the leading ODMs and CMs spent 1.3%, and the upstream suppliers, 13 We could not get public estimates of R&D investment for the PC divisions of large multidivisional companies such as HP, Fujitsu, Toshiba, Sony and NEC so they are excluded from the table.
which is where innovation occurs in the PC industry, spent 11.8% on average or nearly nine times greater than the PC makers, ODMs and CMs. 
Industry Level Drivers of Globalization of Innovation
The globalization of innovation in the PC industry has been driven primarily by economic factors and secondarily by relational factors that involve interdependencies of activities, as well as social networks that often influence the choice of suppliers or location. Examples of relational factors include the close interdependence between development and manufacturing of notebook PCs, and the "guanxi" social networks that link Taiwanese firms and managers.
Regarding economic factors, the manufacturing of desktops was primarily pushed offshore to major world regions to reduce production cost, and secondarily for proximity to markets. Manufacturing was then outsourced to CMs as most PC makers looked to further cut costs and concentrate on product design, branding, sales and marketing.
These CMs are currently moving to new locations within each region (Eastern Europe for EMEA, Mexico for North America, and China for Asia-Pacific)-once again to reduce costs. As noted above, for standard build-to-stock desktops, production is increasingly done in China for the U.S. market, as low cost shipping by sea is viable when fast order turnaround is not necessary.
Cost was also the key factor for notebooks, where both development and manufacturing were outsourced or offshored almost from the beginning-first to Japan, then to Taiwan, and currently to China. Japan's capabilities with development and manufacturing of small form factors provided an initial pull, but lower costs, development of strong indigenous engineering capabilities and the fact that Taiwanese firms were considered less likely to compete directly with U.S. firms resulted in U.S. PC vendors shifting to Taiwan. In turn, Taiwan has moved manufacturing to China for lower cost labor, and manufacturing is now pulling some development activities to China as well. Taiwan is trying to expand its role in R&D, design, and other high value activities, and PC vendors have facilitated this through continued outsourcing and by setting up design centers in Taiwan.
Regarding relational factors in the PC industry, it appears that once production moves to a low cost location, it will pull higher level activities to it. Reinforcing our findings about production pulling knowledge work, Lu and Liu (2004) found that the second major location factor for R&D (after access to low cost engineers) is proximity to the manufacturing site. This is particularly true for notebook PCs given the importance of design-for-manufacturability. For example, production engineering and sustaining engineering clearly benefit from proximity to manufacturing, as production problems can be addressed immediately on the factory floor and engineering changes in existing products can be tested in production models from the assembly line. It also makes sense to move pilot production to China rather than maintain an assembly line in Taiwan just for this purpose. Then the question arises whether to move the expensive test equipment from Taiwan to China. If so, then there is more reason to relocate the design review and prototype processes as well.
Beyond proximity considerations in manufacturing, there is a relational "pull" from the ODMs. They often bundle development with manufacturing in order to win contracts. But once the ODM has a contract, the relationship creates incentives for the PC maker to work with the same ODM for future upgrades and enhancements to the product. In addition, there is a great deal of tacit knowledge created in the development process that is known only by the ODM, which creates a further pull. Finally, the close linkage of development activities to manufacturing and the feedback to design from manufacturing has created linkages favoring continuing the ODM relationships.
The concentration of product development and manufacturing in Taiwan and China has reduced cost and accelerated new product innovation, driving down average unit prices (AUP), and helping to expand markets. For example, the worldwide average unit price for a PC and monitor has declined markedly over the last fifteen years (Figure 8) , with desktops and notebooks selling at an average of under $1,100 and $1,400, respectively in the U.S. in 2005, and many models available for well under $1,000. Of course when adjusted for quality improvements, the price decline is much more dramatic. Moreover, the price differences between the U.S. and other regions has declined so that there is now effectively one world price. 
V. Implications of Globalization of Innovation
The globalization of innovation has led to a new global division of labor, with higher value architectural design and business management, along with associated dynamic engineering work done in the U.S. and Japan, whereas much of the development and manufacturing of the physical product, along with related product and process engineering is done in Taiwan and increasingly in China. This new international structure of the PC industry has implications for firm competitiveness and strategy, location of innovation, employment, and U.S. policy.
Implications for U.S. Firm Competitiveness
Overall 
Implications for Firm Strategy
For branded PC vendors, the international innovation network described above enables faster product cycles with quicker integration of new technologies because the Taiwanese companies are good at fast turnaround and there is a good supply of costeffective engineers in Taiwan and China to handle more models, changes, and upgrades.
It has increased consumer choice, helped grow the market, and for a long time was advantageous for Dell because its direct model gave it an advantage in getting those products to the business customer. But now that most firms are efficient in minimizing inventory and getting new products into the market, the fast product cycles could be seen as an expensive race to the bottom that no PC vendor or component supplier really wins (except Intel and Microsoft). 15 Some PC vendors complain that component innovation is too fast, and they feel pressured to introduce too many products for too small markets.
For example, one major PC vendor introduces around 1,000 different consumer desktop SKUs (stock keeping units) in one year globally (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006b) . A question raised by more than one company that we have interviewed is whether the cost of managing so many products might outweigh the benefits of being able to offer products that more closely match the needs of customers.
Beyond desktop and notebook PCs, the growing demand for new products that are Henderson and Clark, 1990) has important differences from the incremental model of development as illustrated in Table 4 . The scale and scope of global collaboration is often greater for radical innovation, as existing technologies are adapted to new uses and new technologies are developed. As a result, there is greater need for joint development with partners, while key technologies (particularly software) are developed internally and the entire process is shaped by strong central vision, integration, and control.
An example of the nature of radical innovation is the iPod, which was developed by Apple in collaboration with many external partners in multiple geographic locations.
Apple used its internal capabilities to create a closely integrated hardware and software design, while relying on outside partners for both standard and custom components, and for manufacturing. For instance, Apple used a reference design and worked jointly with
PortalPlayer to develop the microchip that controlled the iPod's basic functionality. It worked with others for additional chips (e.g., UK's Wolfson Microelectronics for the digital-to-analog sound chip; New York-based Linear Technology for power management chips; California-based Broadcom for a video decoder chip); with Toshiba provided an initial advantage to Dell and Gateway, who were the first to adopt direct sales, but Gateway stumbled badly and Dell's efficiency advantage has been reduced as other PC vendors have gone to direct, BTO sales. The Dell model also has proved less successful in overseas markets where direct sales are less popular than in the U.S. The most important impact of past business model innovation has been a general improvement in the efficiency of the industry as a whole, as most vendors have adopted these practices.
for the 1.8 inch hard drive; and with Taiwan's Inventec for manufacturing (Murtha, et al., forthcoming). Increasingly, hardware-software integration is becoming important as a means of tailoring products to different market requirements such as communications standards, power consumption, language, and customer tastes. Such integration also helps to reduce product costs by enabling standard physical platforms to be produced in large volumes for global sales. More importantly, it enables greater product differentiation for ever finer market segments by customizing through changes in software, rather than through costly physical changes in hardware.
Location of Innovation
Innovation at the national level is closely tied to the presence of both technically skilled and entrepreneurial individuals, the quality of infrastructure, and the presence of advanced users who drive firms to innovate. Rapid diffusion of Internet infrastructure in the U.S. led to ongoing innovation in hardware (e.g., routers, switches), software (e.g., browsers, search engines), and services (e.g. online retailing, banking, stock trading, travel services). The U.S. has seen strong user-driven innovation (Von Hippel, 1998) such as IT-enabled business process redesign and e-commerce in the corporate world and user-created content in the consumer world. From Cisco and Amazon, to Dell and WalMart to Google and MySpace, innovation on the web has largely occurred in the U.S.
By contrast, the relatively slow adoption of broadband and advanced mobile technologies in the U.S. has left the country falling behind in new areas of innovation.
For instance, South Korea is a leader in online computer gaming, thanks in part to its widespread deployment of cheap broadband Internet service. Japan's iMode system for mobile Internet was years ahead of similar services in the U.S. High rates of wireless adoption have benefited firms from South Korea, Japan and Northern Europe, while
China's large mobile phone market has attracted firms such as Motorola, Nokia, and
Siemens to do product development there. In short, the lack of innovation in industries that are providers of complementary assets (which in turn may reflect the outmoded infrastructure underpinning the large and otherwise highly sophisticated U.S. domestic market) is a major factor hampering innovation in the PC industry. If the U.S. is to retain its position as a leading market for computing innovation, it cannot afford to remain behind in providing high quality, low cost infrastructure to support user-led innovation and drive demand for new personal computing products.
Our field interviews indicate that design innovation, especially concept design and product planning, is likely to remain centralized in the U.S. for the major U.S. firms in the personal computing industry. However, there will be increasing use of offshore R&D and design centers in locations that have specialized and cost-effective talent, lead in particular technical innovations, or represent important markets in terms of growth potential, special market opportunities (fewer regulatory requirements, government incentives), or challenges (need for cheaper or environmentally friendly PCs), or that may influence technical standards (as China is trying to do in a number of technologies).
Private interviews with industry executives indicate that the primary motivation for such offshore outposts is cost reduction, through hiring less costly engineers, programmers, and managers to perform activities previously performed in-house in the U.S. or in a foreign subsidiary. In time, secondary benefits may also arise as these locations gain capabilities or local markets develop.
Other product development activities tend to be pulled by production, beginning with manufacturing process engineering and then moving up to prototyping and testing, and eventually electrical, mechanical and software engineering. These are in the process of shifting to China from Taiwan and Japan, although R&D, design, and development of newest generation products is still likely to be concentrated in the home countries of the manufacturers (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006a) .
Impacts on Jobs and Employment
With respect to U.S. workers, much of the potential shift of jobs offshore has already taken place with the offshoring and outsourcing of production from 1990-2005.
There has also been a shift in innovation-related jobs after 2000, as production has pulled development and some design activities to Asia (Dedrick and Kraemer, 2006a) . Further movement of jobs offshore is likely in the future in order to meet competitive pressure for continuous cost reduction. The jobs will be in engineering, software, industrial design, engineering management, and project management at all levels. As one PC industry executive told us in interviews, he has to "push" more physical design and project management jobs overseas in order to keep concept design jobs at home.
The number of jobs directly moved offshore is not large and occurs incrementally.
However, another indicator of the impact of offshoring is the number of new jobs that are created offshore rather than in the U.S. to support the industry's continued growth and proliferation of products. One indicator of this impact is the growth of knowledge jobs in the notebook industry in Taiwan As software becomes an increasingly important part of new PC products, there will be a proportionately greater increase in software jobs being moved offshore. In one company we interviewed, 50% of the 1,000 employees are engineers and 80% of these are software engineers. These jobs are currently in the U.S., but the firm is experimenting with offshore teams. While there is broad awareness of the shift of jobs to India and elsewhere by software and IT services companies, there is less awareness of the number of software jobs within the computer hardware industry-jobs that are likewise vulnerable to offshoring.
For the U.S., the fact that growth and innovation in the industry is not creating new knowledge jobs (engineering, software, design) in the U.S. while creating them in Taiwan history is a reliable guide, even home office and corporate functions will cease to exist". (Kotkin and Friedman, 2004) However, earlier industry innovations as well as recent innovations like the iPod, the Treo and the Microsoft Xbox were developed mostly in the U.S., even though some component innovations came from offshore suppliers and all the manufacturing was done offshore. Moreover, there is little evidence thus far that these firms have "lost control" of the designs or technology for these products. Such innovation is less likely to move offshore and should continue to support engineering and other knowledge jobs in the U.S., as long as the U.S. retains the capabilities needed for such innovation.
Implications for Policy: Sustaining U.S. Innovation Leadership
Although U.S. PC vendors still lead innovation in the industry, they are moving more innovation activities offshore both through setting up design centers and outsourcing design and development activities to ODMs. The U.S. suppliers of key components such as microprocessors, storage, and software are also setting up R&D and design centers offshore, sometimes in locations with specialized skills such as Israel or Japan, and sometimes in big emerging markets with low cost engineering talent such as India and China.
The engineering, software development, and management skills associated with these activities are key to the innovation capabilities of the U.S. and therefore consideration needs to be given to developing people with these skills if such innovation is to remain in the U.S. (Committee on the Engineer of 2020, National Academy of Engineering, 2005). Our interviews with executives indicate there is a growing need across the PC industry for engineers who are specifically trained to work at the interface between hardware engineering, communications, and computer science. The executives also indicate that many U.S. engineering schools produce specialists in a single engineering discipline, but few schools produce people who can work at the interfaces of these disciplines. There is a need, for example, for hardware engineers who can work with communications standards, and software engineers who can produce embedded software that enables customization of products for markets. When universities fail to develop such talent, firms may rely on on-the-job training, look offshore for experienced people with the needed skills, or develop the skills offshore through on-the-job training of low cost specialists.
It is also likely that U.S. firms need to make greater efforts to hire rookies and develop them. Several of the companies we interviewed prefer to hire fairly experienced engineers rather than beginners, and report no problems in doing so in Silicon Valley or elsewhere. They simply hire people away from other companies, or bring in engineers from foreign countries under immigration policy. However, one highly innovative company we interviewed hired engineers as interns from the best engineering schools in the U.S. (e.g., Cornell, MIT, UC Berkeley, Carnegie-Mellon) and if they worked out, made commitments to hire them even before they graduated. Starting as interns, they worked as part of project teams with operational roles and real challenges to overcome.
Such on-the-job training can help sustain a career ladder for new engineers as firms offshore more lower level jobs that would normally be filled by entry level engineers. An executive for the firm argued that this process benefits the firm as well, by giving it access to the best talent available and the chance to incorporate them into product development teams and learn how the company works before the engineers develop bad habits elsewhere.
From a policy perspective, the U.S. government can encourage cross-disciplinary education and more university-industry cooperation through its funding choices, and by documenting and publicizing the need for such changes. While universities are responsive to employer needs, there can be significant inertia in academic departments and university bureaucracies, and external resources and pressure can encourage greater responsiveness and flexibility.
All of the firms we interviewed indicated a need for more H1B visas, and/or for reform of the visa process. One issue involves procedures for keeping people who have been educated in the U.S. and perhaps interned with the firm. Another involves recruiting from abroad for skills where the U.S. supply of talent is limited, but other countries are noted for having people with the needed skills. For example, it appears that the supply of engineers in analog fields such as radio frequency in the U.S. is limited, whereas there is a good supply in some European countries. A reported problem with the current immigration process is that the nature of U.S. supply of talent is not considered.
From an immigration standpoint, an engineer is an engineer regardless of education level (bachelor, master's, PhD) and there is no way to identify and respond to shortages of very specific skills or levels (e.g., bachelor vs. PhD).
In addition to such human resource issues, another key concern is sustaining the demand for innovation. PC demand, and associated innovation, has been driven in the past decade largely by the Internet and networking in general. With the U.S. leading in Internet adoption, the PC industry was quick to adopt networking technologies such as Ethernet and wireless networking, and new products such as the Blackberry and Treo were developed in the U.S. However, the U.S. has fallen behind a number of countries in both wireless and broadband adoption and is not the lead market for products and services such as mobile phones and online gaming. As a result, innovations in new personal computing devices such as smart phones, video game consoles and other network devices are likely to target foreign markets initially, making it more likely that innovation will occur in those markets rather than the U.S.
While specific policy issues with regard to telecommunications, Internet regulation, content and pricing are beyond the scope of this paper, those decisions should 
